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ANALYSING THE EUROPEAN POLITICS OF INTERNAL SECURITY
Wolfgang Wagner
Knelangen, Wilhelm (2001) Das Politikfeld innere Sicherheit im Integrations-
prozess. Die Entstehung einer europa¨ischen Politik der inneren Sicherheit (Opladen:
Leske & Budrich) ISBN 3 8100 3101 1 (PSI )
Mitsilegas, Valsamis, Monar, Jo¨rg and Rees, Wyn (2003) The European Union
and Internal Security. Guardian of the People? (Basingstoke: Palgrave) ISBN
0 333 96861 1 (EUIS)
Mu¨ller, Thorsten (2003) Integrierte Innen- und Justizpolitik der EU. Eine Analyse
der Integrationsentwicklung (Opladen: Leske & Budrich) ISBN 3 8100 4001 0
(IIJEU )
Occhipinti, John (2003) The Politics of EU Police Co-operation. Toward a
European FBI? (Boulder, CO/London: Lynne Rienner) ISBN 1 58826 118 2
(PEUPC )
A LATE COMER IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Until very recently, the issue area of internal security has been a largely
unknown territory to most students of European integration, although Monika
den Boer and Jo¨rg Monar have been noteworthy exceptions.1 This may not
come as a surprise, considering that internal security itself is a late comer in
European politics. Though the wave of terrorism in the 1970s elicited some
co-ordination among the interior ministers of the European Community, co-
operation in the framework of the so-called TREVI group (‘terrorisme,
radicalisme, extre´misme et violence internationale’) remained outside the Treaty
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framework, informal, behind closed doors, and did not yield any legal activities.
TREVI simply appeared too marginal to merit much academic research.
The situation changed in the early 1990s when the Maastricht Treaty made
‘Justice and Home Affairs’ one of three pillars of the European Union (EU).
Since then developments from within that pillar were reported on a regular
basis, to a large extent by participants in the decision-making process and their
advisers from various think tanks.2 In the ‘grand debates’ among theorists of
European integration of the time, however, Justice and Home Affairs remained
conspicuously absent. Because scholarly interest appeared focused on the first
pillar and its unique institutional setting, asylum and migration policies were
the first issue areas to attract broader attention, especially after they were
communitarized with the Amsterdam Treaty. By the same token, police and
judicial co-operation in criminal matters (as the remnants of the third pillar
are called) continued an existence outside the European as well as the EU
studies community.
The 1999 special European Council on justice and home affairs in Tampere
and, of course, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, marked an end to that
‘splendid isolation’. Over the last couple of years, internal security has become
one of the most dynamic issue areas of European integration.
TAKING STOCK
The authors of the four volumes under consideration here all agree that recent
developments of internal security co-operation are remarkable and call for an
explanation. Notwithstanding their theoretical ambitions (see below), the
studies under consideration are primarily dedicated to the description of EU
internal security co-operation. In doing so, the authors have focused on
different main points and have chosen different ways of presentation.
The most detailed account is given by John Occhipinti in PEUPC. Although
developments in asylum and immigration policy, as well as the respective larger
context of European integration, are usually mentioned, PEUPC focuses on
criminal justice and police co-operation proper. An important structuring
principle of his account are the consecutive Presidencies. This structure high-
lights the changing agenda of internal security co-operation, often in response
to external events such as the tragic death of Chinese illegal immigrants (giving
rise to the fight against human trafficking), the introduction of the euro (leading
to priority given to the search for measures against counterfeiting) and, of course,
the changing agenda of combatting terrorism in the aftermath of September
11th. In addition, this structure highlights the stops and starts of various pro-
posals in the Byzantine institutional structure. The disadvantage of this struc-
ture, however, is that the major controversies of the time are not necessarily about
the most important issues, as the lengthy discussion on the failed agreement on
the location of the European Police College (CEPOL) may illustrate.
In contrast to PEUPC, PSI focuses on the macro level of European internal
security co-operation, i.e. on the fundamental principles and institutions of
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internal security co-operation that member state governments negotiated in
the Schengen agreement and the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.
Although no effective transfer of competencies from the member states to the
EU has taken place, Knelangen concludes in PSI, a European internal security
policy has emerged which has transformed that issue area’s traditionally close
link to the nation state.
Unlike both PEUPC and PSI, IIJEU (and to a lesser degree EUIS) chose a
systematic rather than a chronological structure. In IIJEU, five indicators are
used to capture the Europeanization of justice and home affairs systematically.
‘Institutionalization’ refers to the creation and further development of institu-
tions (including increases in budget and personnel), whereas ‘constitutionaliza-
tion’ refers to the commoditization of policies. ‘Decision-making capacity’ is
used to measure the amount of legislation as well as the frequency of meetings
of the Council, working groups, etc. Somewhat surprisingly, ‘differentiation’
refers to the range of issues covered. Finally, ‘externalization’ adds the growing
number of contacts and agreement with third countries to the picture. Taken
together, these indicators give a comprehensive picture of the emerging issue area.
INVESTIGATING THE CAUSES
In addition to presenting the most important features of internal security co-
operation, all the authors also investigate the causes of this development.
Although differences in delimiting competing theories and in emphasis remain,
the consensus on the main features of the causal story is striking. Such a basic
consensus has been possible only because none of the authors starts from a
strong commitment to a certain theoretical camp and no one has used internal
security co-operation primarily as a case to promote his theoretical claims.
Instead, the authors clearly privilege capturing complexity over offering parsi-
monious theoretical explanations.
That explanatory consensus holds that internal security co-operation has
been driven by a mix of two important factors (the complementary, rather
than mutually exclusive, nature of the theories is stressed by all authors). First,
the EU member states have become unable to meet the transnational challenges
of organized crime and terrorism unilaterally and therefore have strong
incentives to co-operate. To a large extent, these transnational challenges have
emerged from outside the Community, such as the terrorist attacks of
September 11th. However, the already existing level of integration, particularly
among the members of the Schengen area, has further stimulated a collective
response. Moreover, some challenges such as combatting counterfeiting of the
euro have emerged from inside the Community, providing even clearer evidence
for the notion of ‘functional spill-over’. In sum, the authors agree that the
functional links between economic integration (including the free movement
of people and a single currency) and internal security co-operation are
significant. A major portion of the explanatory merits are therefore credited to
neofunctionalist theorizing.
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The incentives to co-operate on internal security are balanced, however, by
another explanatory factor, on whose importance the authors agree, namely
the reluctance of member state governments to relinquish competencies in an
issue area ‘that touches the very nerve of the modern nation-state’ (EUIS,
p. 7). The secrecy of the TREVI group, the intergovernmental set-up of the
third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, the maintenance of unanimity until the
present are all attributed to the member states’ interest in preserving their
sovereignty. Thus, intergovernmental theorizing is regarded as an indispensable
complement to neofunctionalism.
While there is a consensus on the main argument, the authors place
different emphases. According to the authors of both PSI and EUIS, common
membership in international institutions has fostered mutual understanding of
national traditions, for example between common law and civil law countries
(EUIS, p. 12). In particular, several decades of co-operation in the Council of
Europe have ‘created gradually a more favourable climate for co-operation on
internal security issues’ (EUIS, p. 21). Drawing on the same causal mechanism
but pointing to a different institution, PSI argues that co-operation in the EU
framework itself has helped common perceptions and mutual trust to emerge.
In PEUPC, Occhipinti adds that ‘federalism’ and ‘concerns for democracy’
have given internal security co-operation some impetus occasionally. Whereas
federalist convictions led the German government to put justice and home
affairs on the agenda of the Maastricht negotiations, concerns for democracy
help to explain why the European Parliament (and to a lesser degree the
European Court of Justice) have gained competencies. Drawing on Tranholm-
Mikkelsen’s distinction between functional, political and cultivated spill-over
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991), these explanatory factors could be integrated into
the neofunctionalist perspective.
Taken together, the theoretical tool-kit which has been elaborated on the
EU’s first pillar seems to go a long way in explaining internal security co-
operation as well. At the same time, however, several authors appear uncomfort-
able with what Didier Bigo has called ‘security continuum’ assigning causal
connections to open borders, immigration and organized crime. Whereas the
author of PSI raises qualms as a noteworthy caveat, PEUPC points to the
importance of perceptions and even reports data from Germany’s federal office
of criminal investigations to buttress them (p. 73). Drawing on securitization
theory as developed by the Copenhagen school, however, EUIS goes furthest
in addressing the problematic link between open borders and transnational
crime. Securitization theory holds that threats are socially constructed in a
process of ‘securitization’ during which an issue is framed as requiring special
action, frequently beyond established rules of the political system (Buzan et al.
1998). Building on the works of Jeff Huysmans and Didier Bigo, the authors
demonstrate that the notion of security is the centre of gravity within the ‘area
of freedom, security and justice’. The meaning of ‘freedom’ in particular has
been defined as a ‘freedom to live in a law abiding environment’.3
As for European security and defence policy, the ‘securitization’ approach
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helps to highlight some special features of internal security co-operation
that distinguishes it from the bulk of European Community politics. Most
importantly, the Europeanization of internal security helps national security
actors to elevate internal security beyond the limits established by routine
politics such as data protection and judicial review requirements. The establish-
ment of a security-centred ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ appears to
illustrate Klaus Dieter Wolf ’s notion of the new raison d’E´tat, i.e. the deliberate
strategy of state executives to expand their room for manoeuvre by transferring
an issue from the national to the European arena (Wolf 1999). As EUIS points
out, internal security is unlikely to be de-securitized in the foreseeable future
because proponents of European integration (with the European Commission
in particular) have recognized it as a vehicle to gain legitimacy and popularity
among citizens.4
Thus, internal security co-operation has also become closely linked to
issues of legitimacy and democracy. Whether Europeanization will lead to a
governance of internal security which is dominated by security agencies and
their concerns with control and surveillance, or whether such a move will
ultimately accelerate ‘the process of establishing a kind of constitutional
superstructure for the enforcement of civic rights and liberties’ (Eder and
Trenz, 2003) is likely to remain a topic of (academic) debate for some time to
come. The deliberations and negotiations in the constitutional Convention
provide ample material to be studied.
RIPE FOR THE GOVERNANCE APPROACH?
In most issue areas, analysing the causes of integration has been supplemented
by studying the actual working of the European institutions. In doing so,
adherents of the so-called governance approach have treated the European
institutions as independent, rather than dependent, variables (cf. Jachtenfuchs
2001). A precondition for such a treatment, however, has been a sufficiently
stable and effective set of institutions, norms and rules governing the issue
area under consideration. Notwithstanding the continuous dynamic of this
issue area, internal security co-operation now seems sufficiently advanced to
warrant a respective treatment.
Much research on European governance has addressed the question of
whether the European polity systematically privileges the interests of producers
in dismantling barriers to free trade over the concerns of consumers and
employees in maintaining high standards of social or environmental protection
(cf., among many others, Scharpf 1999). A similar question should be addressed
regarding the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’: Does the Europeanization
of justice and home affairs systematically privilege the interests of those
providing security (most importantly, the police) over citizens’ concerns about
civil liberties and democratic accountability?
The analysis in EUIS has highlighted that the discourse in justice and home
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affairs is heavily securitized. This analysis should be supplemented, however,
by a thorough analysis of how the institutional set-up of internal security co-
operation impacts on internal security policy. Here, the principle of mutual
recognition of judiciary decisions endorsed at the Tampere European Council
may play a role similar to the 1979 Cassis de Dijon judgment of the European
Court of Justice which introduced the principle of mutual recognition of
national regulations and standards, and thereby paved the way for the internal
market. As with the common market, the benefits of Europeanization may be
distributed unequally between various interest groups. So far, the main
beneficiaries of mutually recognizing judicial decisions have clearly been the
various security-providing agencies whose reach has been extended to the
territories of all EU members. Member states with high standards of defendants’
rights or data protection may therefore be concerned that these standards may
be undermined by a Europeanization of internal security policy. Taking the
single market as a model, the constitutional convention has therefore suggested
that member states shall not be prevented from ‘maintaining or introducing a
higher level of protection for the rights of individuals in criminal procedure’
(art. III-171).
To bring ‘freedom’, ‘security’ and ‘justice’ back into balance, however,
common standards for defendants’ rights, data protection and the like appear
indispensable. As measures of positive integration in general, however, such
standards may be more difficult to achieve than the dismantling of barriers to
criminal prosecution because an explicit consensus in the Council is required.
The literature on the prospects of positive integration could be very helpful in
assessing the future balance between security concerns and individual rights.
By the same token, internal security co-operation is an interesting case for
scholars of European governance seeking to engage with the dynamics of
securitization and concerns for individual rights.
Address for correspondence: Wolfgang Wagner, Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt (PRIF), Leimenrode 29, 60322 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Tel:
ò49 69 95910448. email: wwagner@hsfk.de
NOTES
1 Cf., among many other pieces, den Boer (1996) and Monar (2001). Further
pioneering studies include Anderson et al. (1996); Bigo (1992); Bieber and Monar
(1995); Turnbull and Sandholtz (2001).
2 Insiders’ perspectives have been given by Wenceslas de Lobkowicz and Hans
Claudius Taschner (both European Commission); Willy Bruggeman and Ju¨rgen
Storbeck (both Europol); Klaus Peter Nanz, Kurt Schelter, Markus Hellenthal and
Reinhard Rupprecht (all German Ministry of the Interior).
3 Vienna Action Plan (1998), quoted from EUIS, p. 36.
4 Indeed, survey data from Eurobarometer make clear that a vast majority of citizens
want organized crime and terrorism to be fought at a European rather than at a
nation-state level.
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